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- Siani, J., Tedjeugang, N., & Tchantcho, B. (2023). Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 879-895.
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- Nganmeni, Z., Pongou, R., Tchantcho, B., & Tondji, J. B. (2022). Vaccine and inclusion. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 24(5), 1101-1123.
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- Adin Safokem, Issofa Moyouwou, Aurélien Mekuko, (2021) Axiomatizing the Public Good Index via merging and new arrival properties, Discrete Applied Mathematics 305: 86-102
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- Pongou, R., & Tchantcho, B. (2021). Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 331-351.
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- Courtin, S., & Tchantcho, B. (2019). Public Good indices for games with several levels of approval. The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 20(1), 20190068.
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- Freixas, J., Tchantcho, B., & Tsague, B. P. (2019). A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 255, 21-39.
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- Courtin, S., Nganmeni, Z., & Tchantcho, B. (2017). Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure. Mathematical Social Sciences, 86, 9-17.
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- Martin, M., Nganmeni, Z., & Tchantcho, B. (2017). The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization. Mathematical Social Sciences, 89, 10-19.
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- Pongou, R., Tchantcho, B., & Tedjeugang, N. (2017). Properties of ladder tournaments. European Journal of Operational Research, 263(1), 203-213.
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- Courtin, S., Nganmeni, Z., & Tchantcho, B. (2016). The Shapley–Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games. Theory and Decision, 81, 413-426.
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- Courtin, S., & Tchantcho, B. (2015). A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure. Theory and Decision, 78, 617-628.
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- Courtin, S., Martin, M., & Tchantcho, B. (2015). Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency. Review of Economic Design, 19, 229-245.
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- Andjiga N.G., Aurélien Mekuko, and Moyouwou I. (2014) Metric rationalization of social welfare functions. Mathematical Social Sciences 72: 14--23.
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- Freixas, J., Tchantcho, B., & Tedjeugang, N. (2014). Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention. European Journal of Operational Research, 236(1), 254-260.
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- Freixas, J., Tchantcho, B., & Tedjeugang, N. (2014). Voting games with abstention: Linking completeness and weightedness. Decision support systems, 57, 172-177.
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- Diffo Lambo, L., Tchantcho, B., & Moulen, J. (2012). Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction. International Journal of Game Theory, 41(3), 719-731.
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- Freixas, J., Marciniak, D., & Pons, M. (2012). On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices. European Journal of Operational Research, 216(2), 367-375.
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- Pongou, R., Tchantcho, B., & Diffo Lambo, L. (2011). Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity. Theory and decision, 70, 157-178.
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- Tchantcho, B., Diffo Lambo, L., Pongou, R., & Moulen, J. (2010). On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(3), 379-396.
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- Lambo, L. D., Tchantcho, B., & Moulen, J. (2009). A core of voting games with improved foresight. Mathematical Social Sciences, 58(2), 214-225.
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- Tchantcho, B., & Diffo Lambo, L. (2009). A note on the manipulation of social choice correspondence. Mathématiques et sciences humaines (2000), (186), 65-75.
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- Pongou, R., Diffo Lambo, L., & Tchantcho, B. (2008). Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule. Economic Theory, 35, 555-574.
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- Tchantcho, B., & Diffo Lambo, L. (2008). A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games. Economic Theory, 37, 533-542.
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- Tchantcho, B., Lambo, L. D., Pongou, R., & Engoulou, B. M. (2008). Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories. Games and Economic Behavior, 64(1), 335-350.
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